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Abstract 
The purpose of our study is to examine the effect of Corporate Social Responsibility on 
Corporate Financial Performance. We initially perform a multiple linear regression using 
Ordinary Least Square on an academically recurring model, and then apply cross sectional 
fixed effect to account for heterogeneity. Our panel data is composed of approximatively 
1500 companies over a five year span, totalizing more than 10000 observations. A primary 
contribution that we make to the question is introducing country law regime as a control 
variable, based on Liang & Renneboog (2017) predicator model of CSR. We use 
Sustainalytics ratings to proxy for CSR as their analyses fulfill the latest academic 
requirement on the question. Mixed evidence of the effect of CSR on CFP is found, and we 
also confirm the significance of country law regime as a predicator. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, CSR has gained popularity on a global level. As the world 
economy was shaken by the crisis aftermath (rising unemployment, loss of purchasing power, 
etc.), the public pressure for corporation to reduce their externalities increased, leading 
governments and NGOs to enforce or press for more regulations. Governance measures such 
as code of business conducts and anti-corruption policies increased in occurrences (Jacob, 
2012). Corporate executives were pushed to "contemplate a boarder strategy beyond a focus 
on stock-holders' wealth maximization" (Becchetti, Ciciretti, Hasan, & Kobeissi, 2012, 
p.1628), and consequently, companies devoted more resources to CSR to the point where 
today, many have specific business units for it. In addition, even if a firm’s environmental 
and/or social impact is considered negligible, it is rare to find one that does not at least 
mention CSR in any type of information vector such as website or statement. 
In order to apprehend the relationship between Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) and 
Corporate Social Relationship (CSR), we define the later as follow: 
"Corporate Social Responsibility is the continuing commitment by business to contribute to 
economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families 
as well as of the community and society at large." (World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development) 
In practice, there are hundreds of CSR measures that a company can undergo to match the 
above definition. Those measures range from water and energy smart system, to decent 
salaries and safe work place, or independence between the CEO and the board of directors.  
As implied in the above non-exhaustive list, one way to approach CSR is to divide its 
contribution into 3 categories: Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG). Those are 
usually the three pillars that constitute the framework of the CSR analysis within ESG rating 
companies’ uses (Sustainalystics, KLD, and RobeccoSAM).  
Analyzing a company’s CSR implication is based on quantitative and qualitative methods, 
and similarly to CFP analysis, it relies on the information that the firm is willing to disclose. 
Consequently, transparency is rewarded with better score than non-disclosure. Another 
element to be taken into account is that companies CSR is measured in comparison to its 
industry peers in order to have meaningful interpretation. For instance, services providers 
 5 
 
have on average far lower energy consumption than product manufacturers. Incrementally, we 
can assume that the increase of CSR disclosure during the last decade has improved the 
quality of CSR analysis and thus the precision from the statistical studies of the CFP–CSR 
relationship.  
Defining CSR is fundamental to the understanding of the CFP–CSR relationship because the 
proxy required for the later must at least be comparable across firms of the same industry. 
While CFP is an older and more concrete concept benefiting from international standards 
upon which all financial actors of the market agree upon, CSR is young enough that one 
cannot exclude a future change in its core definition upon which not all actors agree today. 
Today, the CFP–CSR relationship benefits from ESG analysis ratings to proxy for the CSR 
variable, however, such is not always the case. 
In 1972, Bragdon and Marlin were the first to statistically investigate the CFP-CSR 
relationship by researching the correlation between company expenditures on pollution 
control with financial performance using a multiple linear regression (as cited in Margolis, 
Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007). By doing so, they started a flow of consecutive academic 
researches on the CSR-CFP link that would be conducted using two methods: Multiple linear 
regression analysis, and event studies
1
.  
During the last 45 years, the regression model has been constantly improved by subsequent 
academic work. Improvements ranged from new control variable in the equation, to better 
understanding of what are the necessary characteristics of a good sample. Several model 
innovations became academic consensus, and thus stepping stone for further researches. 
Today, several interrogations remain in this type of analysis. The complete understanding of 
how CSR may or may not impact CFP is not fully grasped. While a majority of studies point 
in the direction of positive evidence (Malik, 2015), there remains a thorn in the side of 
researchers in the form of endogeneity and possible hidden variable, leading for instance to 
unsatisfactory explanation regarding variation from one country to another (Liang & 
Renneboog, 2017), or findings of CSR  negative impact on CFP (López, Garcia, & Rodriguez, 
2007).   
                                                          
1
See Becchetti, Ciciretti, & Hasan, 2009; Flammer, 2013; Krüger, 2015 for more on the event studies 
methodology. 
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Our contribution to the “Does it pay to be good?” question is based on a recent study by Liang 
& Renneboog (2017), that has the potential to become academic consensus. They bring a new 
perspective on the relation between CSR and CFP. According to their work, a country legal 
origin is the strongest predicator of CSR adoption, against other variable, including CFP. But 
as one may overlook, in their study, CSR is the dependent variable, whereas in our line of 
research as well as the main research trend mentioned previously, CSR is the independent 
one. This stems the question of whether law regime is important in explaining the effect of 
CSR on CFP. Therefore, our study uses the later innovation by comparing law regime 
subsample with the hope to explain more precisely the cross-country variation. Intuitively, in 
country law regime where CSR is highly regarded, we expect to find positive evidence of its 
impact on CFP.  
In our contribution, we test the effect of CSR on CFP using a panel sample of approximately 
15000 company observations over 5 years that we derive into several smaller subsamples 
based on different industries and country law regime. We mainly use panel fixed effect 
regressions, measuring CFP as a function of CSR and the following control variables: Firm 
size, financial risk, capital expenditure, turnover, and sales growth.  
Our main finding is that the effects of CSR on CFP are associated with country legal origin. 
The overall evidence is mixed, but there is a thread over the four country law regime groups 
under consideration. CSR tends to have a neutral or positive impact on CFP for firms from 
civil law countries, while negatively affect CFP for firms from common law countries. As for 
ESG analysis, it is interesting to find that the coefficient of governance pillar appears to be 
significantly negative more often than the other two pillars.  
The remainder of this thesis is built as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant literature that 
makes it into academic consensus and provides the theoretical background to interpret 
evidences from our model. Section 3 describes the full spectrum of our methods. Section 4 
presents our results and interpretations, and Section 5 provides a conclusion. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
A fair share of the early literature following Bragdon and Marlin (1972) first empirical 
research of the CFP-CSR relationship predicted a negative impact of CSR over CFP. They 
backed their negative evidences with the idea that CSR was the product of an agency conflict 
between shareholder and manager (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), or that the manager would 
“illicitly” spend the principal’s money or impose a tax  and would not possess the ability or 
the right to solve social and environmental issue instead of the government  (Friedman, 1970). 
In essence, advocate of CSR negative impact stipulated that there was a wealth transfer from 
shareholders to stakeholders by going against the shareholder prime interest of profit 
maximization: The shareholder theory. This theory is prone to era (the 80s) where 
deregulation and neoliberalism are at a pic under the rule of its strong advocates: the UK 
Prime Minister M. Thatcher and the US president R. Reagan. And so, at the time, there is no 
clear consensus on whether CSR has a positive effect or not on CFP. Evidences are overall 
mixed and, given different model specification, can point in any direction. For instance, in 
1975, Vance innovated by extending  the sample observation period to  three  years,  and  
found  that  there  was  a  negative  relationship  between  CSR  and  CFP.  
On top of the overall mixed evidences, the lack of interpretative perspectives was preventing 
clear explanation of positive results, while negative ones were backed by the shareholder 
theory implied previously. However, in 1984, Freeman develops the stakeholder theory that 
will give, the CFP-CSR positive relationship, what Ruf, Muralidhar, Brown, Janney, & Paul, 
(2001) refer to as “the theoretical foundation”. This theory define Stakeholders as “any group 
or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s 
objectives”, and the best interest of the firm is to take into account those very same 
individuals (Freeman, 1984, p.46). And then, Jones (1995), as well as Donaldson & Preston 
(1995) will refine this theory into the instrumental stakeholder theory, which is a modern 
recurring academic justification of CSR positive impact on CFP. Essentially, the instrumental 
stakeholder theory states that CSR action taken in the interest of stakeholders ultimately 
benefit shareholders. I.e. CSR is instrumental (Flammer, 2015). In other words, the 
stakeholder theory is linked to shareholder value maximization through the impact of the firm 
CSR activities on its value.  
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Concretely, there are many ways for CSR to enhance firm value. The following table 
categorizes them into 7 possible sources (Malik, 2015), which can be referred as stakeholders: 
Table 1 Source of CSR enhancing value capabilities and their typical concrete application. 
(Adapted from: Malik, 2015) 
Stakeholder Firm typical CSR activities Source of value Enhancing Capabilities 
of CSR 
Customers Product differentiation oriented on 
sustainability 
After sale and maintenance services 
Create brand value 
Expand customer loyalty 
Suppliers Operational health and safety standard 
Pay decent price 
Reduce operational risk 
Build corporate reputation 
Regulators Comply to voluntary standards 
Comply regulatory requirement 
Influence policy development by raising 
the field of standard regulation 
Reduce litigation risk 
Employee Meeting labor demand 
Professional Training and education 
Offering higher than average wages 
Improve productivity 
Build employer reputation 
Attract better and talented personnel 
Environment Water & energy smart system 
Reduce environmental externalities 
Long term cost reduction 
Build corporate reputation and avoid 
regulatory fine 
Investors Improve reporting quality 
Commit to governance best practices 
Increase market return 
Reduce risk & cost of capital 
Reduce information asymmetry 
Community Contributing disaster relief 
Giving NGO supports 
Get favorable media coverage 
Convey positive managerial signal 
 
By defining firm value as a function of profit maximization and idiosyncratic risk, it is easy to 
understand the above relationships. For instance, profit maximization can often be achieved 
through customer and employee CSR related activities such as sustainable product 
differentiation and improved employment conditions. Product differentiation opens new 
market segment and can be associated with a “sustainability” premium, while attracting 
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talents has always been a key component of corporate strategy for long term profitability. In 
addition, it is also evident that profit maximization is affected by cost reduction measures 
such as smart water and energy system, as well as, environmental policies. The later measures 
are not always considered by manager as harvesting and witnessing their benefits require a 
long-term perspective.  
On the other hand, the idiosyncratic risk is typically affected by operational and reputational 
risk. Both concepts can have dedicated business unit (risk management and marketing). This 
overlap highlights the broadness of the CSR definition.  
2.2 Review of empirical literature 
With the stakeholder theory, studies of CFP-CSR relationship finding positive evidence have 
a theoretical foundation from the mid-80s onward. However, some issues remain in the form 
of a lack of comprehensive CSR measure and methodological rigor (Ruf et al., 2001). Model 
misspecification and "the lack of understanding about the channels through which CSR 
affects firm value" (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013, p.1045), as well as methodological concerns 
(Margolis & Walsh, 2001), are additional reasons behind the lack of clear academic 
consensus, and consequently the constant stream of new research on the subject. 
Model misspecification is best embodied by a recurring constraint in the literature: 
Endogeneity. It is a limitation to results interpretation and might be present in the form of 
omitted variables, selection bias, measurement error, as well as simultaneity between CFP and 
CSR. The later can be interpreted as follows: Firm that performs well might have a greater 
tendency to invest in CSR, rather than CSR inducing good financial performance. 
Recently, Flammer (2015) proposes an innovative regression discontinuity methodology to 
deal with the model misspecification issue. He uses close call shareholder proposals on CSR 
to render randomized CSR adoption of firm, and thus the variation in CSR becomes 
exogenous. Apart from implying that CSR increases firm value, it is further explained that the 
passage of close call CSR proposals benefits firm through improved job satisfaction and 
attracting customers with high eco consciousness. 
As for methodological concern, it has also been constantly improving. In 2000, McWilliams 
& Siegel  introduced a new methodological "best practice" by controlling for R&D and 
advertising expenditure. Considered as omitted control variables, the intuition behind this 
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novelty was that R&D lead to productivity enhancing innovation and advertising expenditure 
is a proxy for industry entry barriers that are considered as a shared asset across firms in an 
industry. 
In addition, Margolis et al. (2007) define in their meta-analysis four standards to improve 
research on the link between CFP and CSR, named the "Well-Worn Path of Refinement": 
Quantifiable CSR data must be clear and open to validation; control of at least industry, risk 
and size, R&D spending, as well as advertising expenditure (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000); 
assessment of the relation at different time period; articulation and test of the relation between 
CFP and CSR. 
In parallel, faced with imperfections of the studies, a number of researchers decide to look at 
the correlation of single component of CSR and CFP. Russo & Fouts (1997) draw on the 
resource-based view and find that environmental performance is positively linked with 
economic performance (p.534). Bauer, Guenster & Otten (2004) analyze the impact of 
corporate governance on stock returns and obtain some evidence on the positive side. 
Recently, Schreck (2011) concludes that it pays to perform social responsibility along the two 
CSR dimensions Environmental Management and Corporate Governance by allowing for 
differences in the importance of single components of CSR between industries (p.183). The 
review of past studies shows that positive impact of CSR on CFP, for at least one single 
component, is evident.  
Eventually, in 2007, Margolis, Elfenbein & Walsh meta-analysis on the CFP-CSR 
relationship counted 167 studies solely using event studies and multiple linear regression. 
Considering that the global financial crisis was just around the corner of the year 2007 and 
had for consequence to increase the amount CSR research overall, one can linearly 
extrapolate that, today, the number CFP-CSR  relationship studies is beyond 200. 
Amidst this stream of research, there is no satisfactory explanation for the fact that if CSR 
theoretically increases CFP, why evidences can differ across diverse countries. In other 
words, if CSR brings value, why do companies in some countries orient their strategies 
toward it, while others do not?  
As highlighted in the introduction, Liang & Renneboog (2017) bring light to this interrogation 
by testing for the country legal origin as the main predicator of CSR.   
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La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1998) first came up with the concept of legal 
origin as related with the laws governing investor protection, the quality of enforcement of 
these laws, and the ownership concentration. They identify five possible categories: Civil 
ones, stemming from French, German, and Scandinavian tradition; Socialist ones, stemming 
from current and former socialist countries, and the English common law.
2
  
Drawing on this classification, Liang & Renneboog (2017) use comprehensive CSR ESG 
ratings data as a proxy for approximately 23000 companies over a timespan of fifteen years, 
to perform a pooled regression, random effects generalized square (GLS), and random effects 
ordered probit models on a specification that sets CSR proxy as the dependent variable over 
several explanatory variables, including legal origin, as well as several firm-level financial 
and governance variables, including Tobin’s Q. In addition, the study also controls for 
country-level variables such as economic development or the World Bank proxy for a country 
regulatory quality
3
. Once again, it is important to note that in this specification, from a 
traditional “does it pay to be good” model perspective, the CFP–CSR relationship is reversed 
because Tobin’s Q is not the dependent variable. 
The pair obtains conclusive significant results across all models; where civil law countries 
firms (Scandinavian, English and French) have positive and significant coefficient, with 
Scandinavian ones having the highest CSR scores, and common law (English) based firms 
having on average lower scores.
4
. The authors explain those differences with three arguments.  
First, common law countries have a strong political orientation toward the shareholder theory. 
This does not come as a surprise, as the political tradition from major common law 
protagonist has always been highly inclined toward neo liberalism (see section 2.1). By 
considering a country legal origin as “the style of control behind its economic life” (as cited in 
Liang & Renneboog, 2017, p.5), one can explain lower CSR scores. Getting to the full extent 
of the pseudo schism between the shareholder and stakeholder theory, civil law countries are 
on the other hand more inclined to possess stronger unions, and more regulations on the 
product and labor markets, that ultimately lead to a stakeholder oriented style of control.      
                                                          
2
 Using those origins, La Porta et al. demonstrate that legal underpinnings of corporate finance differ markedly 
around the world. 
3
 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home 
4
 On a side not, the pair remove socialist countries from their model due to their situation of “transition and 
not equilibrium” (as cited in Liang & Renneboog, 2017, p.16) 
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Then, Liang & Renneboog (2017) introduce an equilibrium between demand and supply for 
CSR as the second and third theory, respectively. Essentially, the demand side is driven by 
consumer predilection for company “good behavior”, while supply is provided by firm and 
“arise as an alternative response to market failures due to inefficient regulations” (as cited in 
Liang & Renneboog, 2017, p.5). This equilibrium defines the relation between CSR and legal 
origin. If demand is more important than supply, it indicates that stakeholders have stronger 
social preference (like in civil law countries), and vice versa.    
Based on those theories, the authors extend their study to investigate if systematic differences 
across legal origin are due to change in the demand for CSR. Beyond the scope of our study, 
they perform three quasi-natural experiments of shocks to CSR demand, which at the same 
time allow them to control for country fixed effects. Those shocks are health and 
environmental major controversies such as the Deep-water Horizon oil spill. The authors 
conclude that such argument is not a valid channel for explaining the impact of legal origin 
over CSR. Nevertheless, they continue their investigation of possible underlying factor, and 
ultimately find that low shareholder litigation risk is associated with firm effort to go beyond 
CSR law requirement.   
Ultimately, Liang & Renneboog (2017) latest development indirectly offers new perspectives 
on the traditional CFP–CSR relationship that we exploit in our analysis.  
3. Methods 
3.1 Sample and data on corporate social performance 
The previous empirical research in CSR field extensively used proprietary data from Kinder, 
Lydenberg, Domini (KLD), which provides a reasonably good measurement of companies’ 
overall corporate social performance (Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009; Ding, Ferreira, & 
Wongchoti, 2016; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000) and is recognized as the de facto research 
standard at the moment (Waddock, 2003). Its dataset is designed as a binary system through 
rating companies on seven attributes: community, environment, human rights, employee 
relationships, product, diversity, and governance. With respect to each attributes, a company 
scores a “1” for strength and scores a “0” for weakness (Ding et al., 2016). In this paper, we 
propose an alternative source of ESG data, from Sustainalytics, an independent rating agency 
that evaluates the sustainability of about 7000 publicly traded companies around the world, 
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covering all major industries. Like most agencies’ rating process, Sustainalytics follows a 
comprehensive indicator-based method on the following three pillars: environmental, social 
and governance (Nitsche & Schröder, 2015). Each pillar is then subdivided into different 
categories, which are summarized in table 2. All described categories, depending on the 
industry in which the firm operates, are assessed relative to peer groups based on a total of 
approximately 60 to 100 indicators (Nitsche & Schröder, 2015). Each peer group has its own 
weighting of ESG, and then the companies’ total ESG scores are calculated. 
Table 2 Corporate Rating Criteria. (Adapted from: Nitsche & Schröder, 2015) 
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For clarity purpose, we pooled the original CSR proxy data, which has more than 50 peer 
groups, into 11 big ones, by referring to the Industry Benchmark Classification (IBC). The 
summary statistics described in table 3 (in appendix) demonstrate the ESG score differences 
across industries in detail. 
One of the motivations using Sustainalytics dataset instead of KLD’s is that Sustainalytics 
ESG ratings point scores between 0 and 100, which could definitely capture more 
differentiation compared to the 14 dichotomous variables of “strength” and “concern” 
employed by KLD. In line with Ding et al., (2016), if the range of possible CSR scores is 
confined to only several integers, ranking CSR scores across firms proves difficult (p.88). 
From a methodological implementation perspective, including each strength and concern 
dummy variable into the econometric models would also be problematic. If simply 
aggregating KLD dummies, which is the widely-used approach, all the dimensions of concern 
and strength are erroneously assumed equally important and perfectly opposite (Burbano, 
2014). Such noisy aggregate measures of a firm’s true CSR levels might obscure information 
and make interpretation of results difficult (Ding et al., 2016; Schreck, 2011).  
 14 
 
The accessible Sustainalytics ESG rating data is over the period 2012-2017 with unevenly 
spaced time intervals. Our sample comprise 1500 companies all included in the MSCI world 
index. Therefore, we are able to set up an unbalanced panel data consisting of more than 
10000 firm-time observations, with each firm rated by ESG scores around every half-year. A 
small number of firms in Sustainalytics original dataset are removed due to missing ESG data 
for too many time points. Moreover, this study assumes testing the long-term benefits of CSR 
adoption on firm value. 
3.2 Corporate financial performance  
In this study, a market-based measure is employed to assess whether corporate social 
performance has any significant impact on financial performance. This is always critically 
compared with an accounting-based measure. Whilst many scholars chose accounting-based 
measures such as return on assets to proxy for corporate financial performance in their 
empirical studies on CFP-CSR relationship, Ding et al., (2016) and Pan, Sha, Zhang, & Ke, 
(2014) argue that the market-based indicator of financial performance is superior to traditional 
performance measures in recognizing the long-term impact of CSR. Moreover, the accounting 
indicators are also backward-looking and are subject to the risk of being manipulated.  
We use Tobin’s Q as the CFP proxy as it is the most frequently applied market-based measure 
of corporate financial performance. The basic principle of Tobin’s Q involves calculating the 
market value of a firm divided by the replacement cost of the firm’s assets. This ratio is useful 
for the valuation of a company in the long run. We derive the data of Tobin’s Q for all the 
sample firms from Bloomberg database.  
3.3 Control variables 
In order to avoid omitted-variable bias and credibly make a causal interpretation between 
CSR adoption and firm value, control variables must be added in the regression model. 
3.3.1 Firm-level control variables 
Standard firm-level characteristics that jointly influence both CSR implementation and firm 
value are firm size and risk. Servaes & Tamayo (2013) point out that advertising expense 
intensity increase customers’ awareness about the firm’s CSR involvement, which in turn 
makes it more likely that customers will reward the firm for its CSR efforts. Recent studies 
have also shown a significant correlation between R&D resource and CSR, thereby R&D 
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expense intensity must be included in the analysis to avoid results giving an upwardly biased 
estimate of the CSR variable (Padget & Galan, 2010). Other possible controls consist of 
capital expenditure, sales growth and turnover. In a nutshell, these financial variables can be 
defined as follows: firm size = the natural log of total assets; risk = total debt over total assets; 
R&D intensity = R&D spending over total sales; advertising intensity = advertising expense 
over total sales; capital expenditure = Capital expenditure over total assets; sales growth = 
changes in sales at time t over sales at time t-1. Turnover = total amount traded in the 
security’s currency. The data for all the above variables could be obtained (and calculated) 
from Bloomberg database. (Refer to the appendix for details of all those financial variables’ 
definitions and computational formulas).  
Table 4 Financial characteristics  
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the financial characteristics of the pooled sample 
spanning 2012-2017.  
  TOBIN_Q_RATIO SALES_GROWTH TURNOVER RISK 
Mean 1.812 7.722 1.458E+08 0.613 
Standard Error 0.011 1.605 1.070E+07 0.002 
Median 1.384 2.942 3.223E+07 0.610 
Standard Deviation 1.335 195.855 1.291E+09 0.223 
Minimum 0.486 -392.308 13548.730 0.003 
Maximum 22.920 16186.343 7.328E+10 2.032 
  CAPEX/Total Assets SIZE R&D expense/sales Advertising expense/sales 
Mean 0.014 9.796 0.382 0.153 
Standard Error 0.000 0.012 0.003 0.003 
Median 0.009 9.576 0.315 0.115 
Standard Deviation 0.019 1.477 0.236 0.136 
Minimum 0.000 2.020 -0.184 -0.328 
Maximum 0.486 14.850 1.818 0.881 
 
3.3.2 Industry-level control variables 
It is believed that stakeholders of different industries may vary in the interests, concerns, and 
the degree of scrutiny (Palmer, 2012). Some industries are intrinsically regarded more “dirty” 
than others, and constrained by more restrictive rules and regulations, such as heavy 
manufacturing or chemicals; and some industries face stronger competitive intensity 
(Margolis et al., 2007; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). As can be seen from table 3, the average 
ESG score differs across industries. Therefore, the industry dummy variables must be 
included in the econometric model to control for some industry-level variation.  
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3.3.3 Country-level control variables 
A difference compared to past studies is that country-level factors are considered in our study 
to make CSR adoption as good as random across countries. Once again, this is based on the 
up-to-date finding of Liang and Renneboog (2017), which brings evidence that a firm’s social 
responsibility practice is strongly correlated with the country’s legal origin (common or civil). 
Following this previous research, we come up with five categories of country law regime: 
Scandinavian civil law, German civil law, French civil law, English common law, and 
socialist law; and we sort which legal origin the company pertains to according to the country 
where the company is headquartered. Due to the very limited CSR proxy data of companies 
from socialist law tradition, we only add the other four country-level controls. 
Table 7 Sustainalytics ESG descriptive statistics by country law regime 
This table describes the ESG scores for the four country law regime: English, French, German 
and Scandinavian. On average, companies from Scandinavian legal regime obtain the highest 
ESG scores than companies from others. The results are in consistence with Liang and 
Renneboog (2017), i.e., firms from common law countries have lower ESG scores than firms 
from civil law countries 
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    ESG Governance Social Environment   ESG Governance Social Environment 
G
ER
M
A
N
 
Mean 61.435 60.789 59.415 64.345 
SC
A
N
D
IN
A
V
IA
N
 70.896 72.100 70.732 70.364 
SE 0.245 0.233 0.290 0.339 0.430 0.446 0.472 0.605 
Median 61.435 59.505 58.365 65.780 71.660 72.750 71.870 71.580 
SDev 10.169 9.673 12.046 14.052 8.714 9.052 9.573 12.271 
Minimum 37.250 39.400 30.500 28.030 47.550 45.040 44.530 35.630 
Maximum 87.920 87.250 93.660 98.330 88.820 96.000 91.980 94.630 
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3.4 Estimated models 
In the light of earlier discussion, we construct the initial model as: 
                  
                  
             
                 
      
  
        
                  (1) 
where               ,          ,and               are the vectors of the single pillar 
component scores of the CSR measure;      is a group of the vectors of firm-level control 
variables (when testing the model, we get rid of the advertising expense intensity and R&D 
expense intensity variables because only about 20% of our 1500 companies report those data); 
     is the vector of dummy variables indicating country law regime  groups; and          is 
the vector of dummy variables indicating industry groups. It could be reasonably assumed that 
Country law regime and industry variables are time-invariant.  
The regression coefficients of Eq.(1) on the full sample are estimated by OLS. As the BPG 
(Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey) test for heteroscedasticity of error terms rejected the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity at the 1% significance level (see appendix), the 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors should be used. 
Obviously, the regression coefficients estimated from Eq.(1) would be suspicious due to the 
issue of endogeneity. As has been mentioned in the literature review, endogeneity might be 
caused by omitted variable bias and simultaneity between CSR and CFP. Therefore, we 
further include the fixed effects and the lagged effects in order to improve robustness of the 
results. The random effects do not provide a solution to endogeneity because in the RE case, 
the covariance between error term and predictor is zero; in other words, endogeneity by 
definition is not a concern.  
Specifically, the ideal solution that we suppose is running the following lagged model with 
fixed effects: 
                 
                    
               
                   
                                                                                                                                        
(2) 
Above all, the financial benefits of CSR implementation reflected in firm value cannot be 
immediate due to factors such as information asymmetry. The lagged CSR variable acts like 
instrumental variable as it fulfils the prerequisites of relevance and exogeneity (Schreck, 
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2011). We lag the CSR proxy measures by one period in order to address potential 
simultaneity. This equation does not include     and          since the fixed effects will 
ultimately remove all the dummies.  
4. Results 
4.1 Results analysis on the full sample 
We start by a simple pooled OLS regression by running Eq.(1) on the full sample. In order to 
avoid the dummy variable trap, we drop one of the categorical variables Scandinavian and 
Consumer discretionary in the country law regime dummy group and industry dummy group, 
respectively.  Model 1 of table 5 presents the results of Tobin’s Q as a function of current 
environment, social and governance component scores, controlling for firm characteristics, 
industry and country law regime. Notably, none of the three pillars of ESG is significant. 
The simple pooled regression assumes that there is no heterogeneity in the cross-sectional 
dimension as well as in the time dimension; however, it is clearly not the case. The joint 
significance test of fixed effects dummies (cross-section) shows that FE dummies are 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. Therefore, we model the same 
relationship without CLRi and Industryi and add firm-level FE to control for unobservable 
cross-sectional heterogeneity, including management talent, corporate culture and so on. 
Interestingly, the coefficient of the three CSR variables all change sign, although only the 
coefficient of governance becomes significantly negative, as provided in model 2 of table 5. 
Moreover, the adjusted R squared increases by approximately 60% once the unobservable 
firm-specific characteristics is controlled for, indicating most of the variation in Tobin’s Q are 
cross-sectional and absorbed by FE. Both the substantial increase in adjusted R squared and 
the sheer fact that the coefficients change in sign and significance manifest heterogeneity is a 
major issue, and at least governancei, is correlated with certain unobservable heterogeneity 
that influences CFP.  
Apart from omitted variable bias, there is another issue of simultaneity, i.e., not only the 
firm’s corporate social performance will affect firm value, but also the firm’s financial 
performance will have an impact on its CSR involvement. The reasoning behind this reverse 
cycle is conceivable: a firm’s CSR spending depends on its access to the discretionary funds, 
which in turn is largely determined by the firm’s financial outcomes. Confronted with this 
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issue, we decide to use the one-period lagged CSR explanatory variables. Models 3 and 4 in 
table 5 both employ Eq.(2), which captures the lagged effects and utilize a FE approach, 
except that in model 4 additional control variables R&D expense intensity and advertising 
expense intensity are included. Theoretically, model 4 is the best possible model, but it is only 
applicable on the full sample since we do not have sufficient observations of R&D expense 
intensity and advertising expense intensity on the sub-samples. The distinct difference, in 
comparison, is that model 3 has a significant coefficient of governance while this coefficient 
is insignificant in model 4.  
Model 5 of table 5 employs period FE approach on Eq.(2) in consideration of certain period-
specific shocks that affect all firms in a similar way. The period FE dummies joint 
significance test confirms that heterogeneity exists in the time dimension as well. Contrasted 
with the aforementioned models, there are several obvious changes, for instance, social 
becomes significantly negative and governance changes to be insignificant. Notably, the 
adjusted R squared drops to 21% once we use the period FE, which illuminates the low 
explanatory power of the period FE model. Since country legal origin and industry variables 
are assumed time-invariant in our estimated model (due to relatively short sample period), and 
firm-specific characteristics heterogeneity proves to be our major concern (as explained 
before), we only use the one-way error component model, i.e., cross-section FE model, 
throughout our analysis. 
Overall, the pooled regression results appear to suggest that CSR does not have a positive 
impact on CFP, and particularly good rating on governance even affects firm value negatively, 
which contradicts with some previous studies that offer insights for a positive correlation 
between them (Bauer et al., 2004; Schreck, 2011). By virtue of huge sample data, we proceed 
to investigate the CFP-CSR relationship focusing on the individual subsamples, grouped 
according to country law regime and industry separately. The results are analyzed in the next 
section. 
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Table 5 Relationship between CSR and CFP (Pooled) 
This table reports the regression coefficients for the relationship between CSR and CFP over 
2012-2017. All models are run using the full sample. Model 1 presents the OLS results, while 
model 2-4 present the cross-section FE results and model 5 shows the period FE results. In 
model 3, 4 and 5, environment, social and governance are all lagged for one period. Model 4 
is proposed to be the ideal model, in which we additionally control for advertising intensity 
and R&D intensity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 1 (POOLED DUMMIES) 2 (POOLED FE) 3 (LAG POOLED FE) 4 (LAG POOLED FE IDEAL) 5 (PERIOD FIX EFFECT) 
ENVIRONMENT -0.0002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.003 
 
(0.87) (0.6205) (0.1657) (0.8280) (0.1222) 
SOCIAL -4.61E-05 7.50E-05 0.000 0.002 -0.009 
 
(0.975) (0.9668) (0.9420) (0.2841) (0.0107)** 
GOVERNANCE 0.0016 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.004 
 
(0.315) (0.0049)* (0.0000)* (0.3936) (0.2547) 
SIZE -0.4573 -0.563 -0.578 -1.018 -0.485 
 
(0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)* 
RISK 0.370 0.240 0.182 0.941 0.502 
 
(0.000)* (0.1968) (0.2477) (0.0106)** (0.0169)** 
CAPEX_TOTAL_ASSETS 2.167 0.819 0.649 4.083 -3.184 
 
(0.0016)* (0.1957) (0.1938) (0.2552) (0.0161)** 
TURNOVER 1.14E-11 -2.12E-13 -1.29E-12 -2.54E-11 2.46E-11 
 
(0.1599) (0.8974) (0.5355) (0.1344) (0.0386)** 
SALES_GROWTH 0.0001 3.18E-05 3.55E-05 0.009 6.65E-05 
 
(0.0408)** (0.0457)** (0.1580) (0.0000)* (0.2708) 
ADVERTISING_EXPENSE_SALE 
   
-3.126 
 
    
(0.0013)* 
 
R_D_EXPENSE_SALES 
   
5.086 
 
    
(0.0757)*** 
 
CLR="English" -0.164 
    
 
(0.0086)* 
    CLR="French" -0.259 
    
 
(0.0001)* 
    CLR="German" -0.525 
    
 
(0.0000)* 
    IND.="Consumer Staples" -0.015657 
    
 
(0.7676) 
    IND.="Energy" -0.635574 
    
 
(0.0000)* 
    IND.="Financials" -0.125 
    
 
(0.0125)** 
    IND.="Health Care" 0.659 
    
 
(0.0000)* 
    IND.="Industrials" -0.467 
    
 
(0.0000)* 
    IND.="Information Technology" 0.196 
    
 
(0.0000)* 
    IND.="Materials" -0.584 
    
 
(0.0000)* 
    IND.="Real Estate" -0.849 
    
 
(0.0000)* 
    IND.="Telecommunication 
Services" 
-0.298 
    
 
(0.0000)* 
    IND.="Utilities" -0.649 
    
 
(0.0000)* 
    Intercept 6.45 7.417 7.823 11.563 6.469
 
(0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)* 
Adj. R squared 0.299 0.903 0.924 0.904 0.215 
N 10964 10964 9686 992 9686 
 
* Indicate significance at the 1% level;  **Indicate significance at the 5% level;  ***Indicate significance at the 10% level 
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4.2 Results analysis on the subsample 
When conducting analysis on the subsamples, all models in table 6 employ Eq.(2) and cross-
section fixed effects as this model has been proved to be a relatively better one that addresses 
endogeneity (although it could not completely eliminate endogeneity bias). 
4.2.1 Results comparison among country law region groups 
The results of model 7 (French civil law) in table 6 are very similar to those of the pooled 
model, i.e., only the coefficient of governance is negative and significant. In the French civil 
law countries, firm ownership is extremely concentrated (La Porta et al., 1998). Accordingly, 
more CSR spending on the governance issue might be not meaningful as the agency conflicts 
are less outstanding in firms with highly concentrated ownership. 
However, for the English common law group, the coefficient of environment is also 
significantly negative in addition to governance. These indicate that corporate social practice 
inversely affects firm value, particularly for the English common law group. In general, 
shareholders and creditors in common-law countries, relatively speaking, are given the 
strongest protections (La Porta et al., 1998). Therefore, it is highly likely that Friedman’s 
view of CSR, namely, the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits, will be 
more prevalent in English common law group. This is because that, especially in the short 
term, CSR spending will directly reduce firm earnings by an amount that should have been 
distributed to shareholders and creditors, while its benefits are relatively unpredictable. CSR 
adoption, from shareholder and creditor’s perspectives, may be not worth the candle. 
Further, since both model 6 and 7 report negative coefficient of governance, and the absolute 
coefficient value in the French civil law group is almost three times larger than it in the 
English common law group, we wonder if the difference between the coefficients estimated 
from the two groups is significant or not. 
In order to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients of governance estimated from these 
two groups are equal, denoted as b(F) and b(E), respectively, we use a simple formula 
 ( )  ( )
√  ( )    ( ) 
, in which SE (standard error) is an approximation and based on the assumption 
that the tested coefficients are independent. The calculated test statistics has an absolute value 
of 2.77, meaning it is significant at the conventional levels. Actually, if both coefficients are 
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significant, the difference will necessarily be significant, so the test result confirms our 
regression results.  
Then we apply the same formula to other pairs of coefficients, where at least one of them is 
significant. The test statistics are summarized in a table presented in the appendix. We are 
particularly interested in the pairs that one of them is significant and the other one is 
insignificant. We can see that, for example, there are actually significant differences between 
Scandinavian group and French group, also Scandinavian group and German group in terms 
of the coefficients of environment. However, test statistics show that the difference of 
governance coefficient is insignificant between English group and German group, as well as 
for the English and Scandinavian group. Consequently, there may be a possibility that the 
negative effect of governance in the English group is overestimated.  
Furthermore, model 8 of table 6 displays that there is no significant coefficient of 
environment, social or governance, meaning the impact of CSR on CFP is neutral in the 
German civil law group. The positive and significant coefficient of environment in model 9 
suggests that higher ranking of CSR, specifically in the aspect of environment, is beneficial 
for firms from Scandinavian countries. In essence, CSR reflects social preferences for good 
corporate behaviour and a stakeholder orientation (Liang & Renneboog, 2017). Therefore, the 
positive evidence is not surprising as environmental-friendly products or services are highly 
valued in Scandinavian countries, which are known to be global leader in sustainability 
(Strand, Freeman & Hockerts, 2015). In accordance with La Porta et al. (1998), the quality of 
law enforcement is the highest in Scandinavian and German civil law countries. To put it 
simple, more CSR adoption means better relation with government, which is definitely in 
favor of business development.  
To summarize, results are mixed if we shed light on the role of law tradition in deriving 
financial outcomes, however, it is certain that legal origin could explain somehow the 
differences between groups. Generally speaking, the CFP-CSR relationship appears to be 
more negative in common law countries, while neutral or positive in civil law countries. What 
is more, social component of CSR ranking does not tend to influence firm value regardless of 
the country legal origin. 
 
 23 
 
Table 6 Relationship between CSR and CFP (CLR sub-sample) 
This table reports the regression coefficients for the relationship between CSR and CFP in the 
country law regime sub-samples. Models 6, 7, 8 and 9 present the lagged, cross-section FE 
results for English, French, German and Scandinavian, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Results comparison among industry groups  
As shown in table 7, the industry-by-industry results are more varied if we divide the full 
sample into 11 pooled peer groups and run Eq.(2) on each of them. It is a little bit difficult to 
discover some distinct patterns, but there are some possible insights that we could give at least 
to some extent. 
The coefficient of environment is significant in four industry groups, among which it is 
negative in industries of Energy, Financials and Utilities while positive in Healthcare industry 
group. The positive evidence is easily interpretable. At first glance, initiatives aimed at 
minimizing the negative impacts of healthcare provision on the environment as well as 
contributions to enhance sustainability would earn firm a good reputation, which is of crucial 
importance in the Healthcare industry where consumers care a lot about “clean” or “dirty”. 
Although Energy, Financial and Utilities are some kind of environmental sensitive industries, 
the negative evidence indicates the costs of social practice tend to exceed its benefits, which 
probably requires further research on it. 
Variables 6 LAG ENGLISH FE CLR 7 LAG FRENCH FE CLR 8 LAG GERMAN FE CLR 9 LAG SCANDINAVIAN FE CLR 
LAG_ENVIRONMENT -0.003 -0.0013 -0.001 0.012 
 
(0.0348)** (0.4504) (0.4521) (0.0000)* 
LAG_SOCIAL -0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.004 
 
(0.8326) (0.1442) (0.1004) (0.5376) 
LAG_GOVERNANCE -0.003 -0.011 -0.001 0.002 
 
(0.0114)** (0.0000)* (0.6940) (0.7150) 
SIZE -0.599 -0.424 -0.288 -0.905 
 
(0.0000)* (0.0021)* (0.0193)** (0.0000)* 
RISK 0.401 -2.145 -0.354 1.788 
 
(0.0214)** (0.0018)* (0.1939) (0.0019)* 
CAPEX_TOTAL_ASSETS 1.801 -6.004 0.878 0.406 
 
(0.0120)** (0.0057)* (0.1738) (0.7923) 
TURNOVER 1.45E-12 -6.65E-13 -7.36E-12 -3.02E-12 
 
(0.5579) (0.9816) (0.0150)** (0.2297) 
SALES_GROWTH 1.82E-05 0.003 0.001 0.0026 
 
(0.3026) (0.0000)* (0.1805) (0.0002)* 
Intercept 7.932 8.091 4.676 9.087 
 
(0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0003)* (0.0000)* 
Adj. R squared 0.918 0.912 0.95 0.957 
N 6722 1083 1515 366 
 
* Indicate significance at the 1% level; **Indicate significance at the 5% level; ***Indicate significance at the 10% level 
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In addition, the results reported in table 7 illustrate that there are not many significant 
relationships between social and Tobin’s Q. The only coefficient of social that is significantly 
negative at the 5% significance level is in Real estate industry group. In contrast, significant 
relationship is more and consistent for governance, i.e., in industries of Consumer 
discretionary, Energy, Industrials and Materials, we all obtain negative evidence.  
Furthermore, we find that in Consumer staples, Information technology and 
Telecommunication services groups, there are no significant results whichever the lagged 
ESG pillar concerned. Such neutral evidence about CFP-CSR relationship may be related to 
the nature of industry to some extent. It is likely that Information technology and 
Telecommunication services companies do not have much stakeholder pressure for CSR, 
because the common belief might be that they have little impact on the environment. Yet such 
argument cannot be applied to Consumer staples, but the large diversity of products in this 
category coupled with the absence of advertising expense control variable might influence the 
results in that direction. This limitation is discussed in the next section. 
Table 7 (part 1) Relationship between CSR and CFP (Industry sub-sample) 
This table presents the regression coefficients for the relationship between CSR and CFP in 
each of the 11 classified industry sub-samples, with the lagged effects and cross-section FE. 
Variables Consumer discretionary Consumer staples Energy Financials Healthcare Industrials 
LAG_ENVIRONMENT 0.000 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 0.011 -0.002 
 
(0.9505) (0.1243) (0.0001)* (0.0015)* (0.0171)** (0.2696) 
LAG_SOCIAL 0.004 0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.3002) (0.9958) (0.0573)*** (0.9003) (0.9192) (0.0588)*** 
LAG_GOVERNANCE -0.013 -0.003 -0.010 0.002 -0.005 -0.002 
 
(0.0000)* (0.1838) (0.0000)* (0.3965) (0.2398) (0.0281)** 
SIZE -0.863 -0.839 -0.580 -0.130 -0.662 -0.597 
 
(0.0019)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0040)* (0.0076)* (0.0000)* 
RISK 0.703 1.028 -1.502 -0.130 0.570 0.290 
 
(0.0091)* (0.0000)* (0.0001)* (0.6797) (0.1295) (0.1060) 
CAPEX_TOTAL_ASSETS -10.444 6.246 2.534 3.504 17.370 1.291 
 
(0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0002)* (0.8084) (0.0013)* (0.1617) 
SALES_GROWTH 0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.002 
 
(0.0003)* (0.1329) (0.0351)** (0.0045)* (0.0950)*** (0.0000)* 
TURNOVER 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.3923) (0.0017)* (0.9394) (0.5874) (0.4625) (0.5653) 
Intercept 10.719 9.948 9.393 2.920 8.230 7.329 
 
(0.0011)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0024)* (0.0000)* 
Adj. R squared 0.900 0.930 0.916 0.965 0.910 0.926 
N 1638.000 605.000 759.000 1273.000 783.000 1368.000 
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Table 7 (part 2) 
Variables Information technology Materials Real estate Telecommunication services Utilities 
LAG_ENVIRONMENT 0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 
 
(0.1675) (0.3507) (0.7141) (0.2192) (0.0008)* 
LAG_SOCIAL 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 0.000 
 
(0.2282) (0.2896) (0.0172)** (0.1733) (0.8089) 
LAG_GOVERNANCE 0.004 -0.009 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.3192) (0.0410) (0.0854)*** (0.3779) (0.5160) 
SIZE -0.835 -0.577 -0.233 -0.499 -0.211 
 
(0.0000)* (0.0000) (0.0000)* (0.0008)* (0.0036)* 
RISK 0.712 -1.085 -0.070 0.420 -1.866 
 
(0.0367)** (0.0379) (0.7923) (0.0271)** (0.0000)* 
CAPEX_TOTAL_ASSETS 16.839 2.135 -0.691 0.796 0.772 
 
(0.0251)** (0.0950) (0.0005)* (0.4913) (0.0029)* 
SALES_GROWTH 0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
 
(0.0000)* (0.0009) (0.2117) (0.3554) (0.5307) 
TURNOVER 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.1731) (0.3591) (0.0063)* (0.3420) (0.1278) 
Intercept 8.907 8.319 3.661 7.002 4.802472 
 
(0.0000)* (0.0000) (0.0000)* (0.0002)* (0.0000)* 
Adj. R squared 0.913 0.879 0.953 0.936 0.951 
N 1003.000 755.000 630.000 285.000 584.000 
 
* Indicate significance at the 1% level  **Indicate significance at the 5% level  ***Indicate significance at the 10% level 
 
4.3 Limitations of results interpretation 
Our findings suggest a mixed correlation between CSR and CFP, but the above analysis of 
results has several limitations. Firstly, as it was mentioned before, sample data of R&D 
expense and advertising expense is not available for many companies, which poses 
restrictions on our empirical analysis. Consequently, running regression without these two 
controls might give an upwardly biased estimate of CSR variables.  
Secondly, fixed effects normalize all variables to have the same mean across firms, so the 
results do not explain variation over the cross section. Nevertheless, there is really not much 
to be done about that. Also, although fixed effects address endogeneity concerns from omitted 
variable bias, it is based on the assumption that unobservable firm-specific characteristics that 
correlate with CSR movements and affects firm value simultaneously are time-invariant. To 
allow variation both cross-sectional and over time, the difference-in-difference methodology 
should be used but we find it difficult to implement it in practice on account of the limited 
time period to find a valid treatment. In addition, we do not believe all endogeneity concerns 
could be effectively eliminated by combining a lagged variable approach and a cross-section 
FE approach. At least, there will undoubtedly be certain measurement error when quantifying 
the abstract or qualitative CSR no matter how comprehensive the approach that Sustainalytics 
follows. In line with Ding et al. (2016), this will ultimately lead to a correlation between the 
error term and the CSR variable  
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Moreover, there lies 2 issues linked with the CSR rating proxy variable. The size of 
subsample is uneven, i.e., some subsamples like Scandinavian when dividing by country legal 
origin and Telecommunication services when dividing by industry have only more than 200 
observations, which might influence the accuracy of regression estimates. And, initially, 
Sustainalytics uses more industry peer groups than the 11 categories of the GICS. Those peer 
groups were forced into those category in order to obtain bigger subsample, but what we gain 
in observation, is lost in analysis precision. This is due to the fact that qualitative and 
quantitative criteria within ESG pillar might have different weights. Of course, with more 
than a 100 criteria, the impact of such difference remains limited.  
Finally, past empirical evidence indicates the CSR-CSF relationship might not be strictly 
linear. Barnett and Salomon (2012) find that firms with low CSR have higher CFP than firms 
with moderate CSR, but firms with high CSR have the highest CFP. In contrast to their 
proposal of the U-shaped CFP-CSR relationship, Flammer (2015) argues the relationship 
between CSR and CFP is concave as the CSR source exhibits diminishing marginal returns. 
However, this study does not take the potential curvature of the CFP-CSR relationship into 
consideration since we do not capture the quadratic nature of CSR in our model equation. 
5. Conclusion and implication 
Our study demonstrates that given the right circumstance, CSR has an impact on CFP, but 
evidence is mostly mixed. The results on the country law regime subsample indicate that the 
legal origin of country where the firm is headquartered is indispensable to understand the 
relationship between CSR and CFP. Overall, it seems that CSR are more valued in civil law 
countries than common law countries. We also find that CSR’s impacts on CFP change sign 
and significance across industries, depending on factors like industry nature. Therefore, the 
CLR-specific relationship and the industry-specific relationship should be considered 
individually and carefully. Moreover, our finding suggests that with respect to the three pillars 
of ESG, it is more often to find significantly negative coefficient of governance, while the 
results of the other two pillars are more varied. Our study uses dataset from Sustainalytics, 
which probably can contribute to the CFP-CSR research field on the comparison of different 
alternative comprehensive CSR datasets. 
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Regarding the methodology, we believe that the constant improvement of CSR reporting 
practices, standardization of rating methods, and the very simple fact that the amount of 
historical data is increasing, will positively affect both comparison between industry peers as 
well as the precision of CFP-CSR regression study. In addition, CSR historical data growth is 
also increasing the likeliness of “recording” a good valid treatment in order to use the 
difference-in-difference methodology that is in this case a superior one when it comes to 
dealing with endogeneity.    
Lastly, rising social and environmental challenges will lead modern societies, and hence most 
of their stakeholders, to demand greater accountability from firms for their potential impact 
and responsibility in facing those challenges is ever so important and undeniable. The global 
pressure on their agent, as well as principal, to do good, is increasing to the extent that one 
could say: time is an unfortunate ally of CSR. 
That being established, shedding light on the relation between CSR and CFP is also a way to 
conciliate the shareholders and stakeholders interests, one being tied to the present while the 
other usually lies a little bit more in the future. Thus research on the CFP-CSR relationship is 
of public utility, and while we can conclude that “doing well” and “doing good” do not 
necessarily overlap, it is also a certitude that they are not mutually exclusives either. In any 
case, in tomorrow’s world, it is a necessity for managers to stretch between CFP and CSR, or 
as Margolis et al. (2007, p.28) put it:  "to learn how companies can navigate a world that 
demands a firm do good and do well". 
. 
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Appendix 
Table 3 Sustainalytics ESG descriptive statistics by industry 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the overall ESG score as well as each of the ESG 
pillar for the 11 pooled peer groups.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Total ESG score Environment Social Governance 
 
Total ESG score Environment Social Governance 
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Mean 59.74983836 64.94481681 59.01678879 57.0247306 
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61.21049601 64.35868025 58.53521701 61.88687334 
Standard Error 0.237473864 0.191155684 0.275770159 0.338496975 0.311130409 0.217545572 0.352864915 0.446996479 
Median 59.28 65.29 57.815 55.665 61.3 64 58.1 62.7 
Count 1856 1856 1856 1856 1129 1129 1129 1129 
Largest(1) 91.04 88.25 93.66 95.71 87.23 87.29 92.06 96.67 
Smallest(1) 39.06 38.05 35.44 33.71 39.74 41 35.71 36.66 
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s Mean 62.62578102 68.12537226 58.99575182 62.85763504 
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64.7879021 71.17832168 64.65481352 60.82131702 
Standard Error 0.318370606 0.308418323 0.399966128 0.400979858 0.300410352 0.354184432 0.359538206 0.37954124 
Median 63.06 68.25 59.86 64.1 65.19 70.35 64.49 62.005 
Count 685 685 685 685 858 858 858 858 
Largest(1) 79.58 91.04 83.5 87 88.82 96 92.72 85.38 
Smallest(1) 38.87 46.42 35.46 31.35 37.3 39.4 38.28 24.65 
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Mean 61.25207701 66.90990665 63.74183197 54.46731622 
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59.23977622 58.76899301 56.4439021 61.69517483 
Standard Error 0.320369301 0.311467139 0.400897952 0.378003995 0.445399904 0.437811012 0.457853728 0.556472508 
Median 59.46 65.4 61.44 53.5 56.57 56.46 53.75 59.77 
Count 857 857 857 857 715 715 715 715 
Largest(1) 88.45 95.44 94.37 84.88 93.68 93.57 94.41 97.19 
Smallest(1) 37.25 45.38 30.5 24.22 40.47 38.33 36.65 37.5 
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62.51869969 65.96885449 55.74226006 65.96885449 
Standard Error 0.277710208 0.294631398 0.241128173 0.404826598 0.620910436 0.855437918 0.676574609 0.855437918 
Median 56.07 56.02 59.42 51.66 63.23 68.06 55.3 68.06 
Count 857 857 857 857 323 323 323 323 
Largest(1) 88.45 95.44 94.37 84.88 85.76 93.79 81.75 90.96 
Smallest(1) 37.25 45.38 30.5 24.22 41.49 49.5 31.23 36.66 
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65.91206897 73.54991004 68.43407796 60.19787106 
Standard Error 0.316703889 0.30133744 0.390548572 0.440307054 0.311696442 0.322110638 0.409322892 0.422385696 
Median 57.49 63.42 50.99 64.6 64.76 74.35 68.12 59.28 
Count 1548 1548 1548 1548 667 667 667 667 
Largest(1) 87.29 92.24 100 94.68 89.29 92.74 97.16 89.61 
Smallest(1) 40.75 44 35.7 32.41 48 48.9 42 39.12 
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Mean 61.49251292 66.58385013 58.31200904 60.98186047 
     Standard Error 0.235115548 0.207923566 0.282903047 0.330235112 
     Median 61.435 66.205 56.93 61.25 
     Count 1548 1548 1548 1548 
     Largest(1) 87.29 92.24 100 94.68 
     Smallest(1) 40.75 44 35.7 32.41 
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Table 8 Bloomberg LP financial variable description and notes 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION (from bloomberg LP): 
TOBIN_Q_RATIO 
Ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of the firm's assets. The Q ratio is useful for the valuation of a company. It is 
based in the hypothesis that in the long run the market value of a company should roughly equal the cost of replacing the company's assets. 
The ratio is computed as follows: 
(Market Cap + Total Liabilities + Preferred Equity + Minority Interest) / Total Assets 
Where: 
Market Cap is RR250, HISTORICAL_MARKET_CAP for historical periods and RR902, CUR_MKT_CAP for daily ratio 
Total Liabilities is RR005, BS_TOT_LIAB2 
Preferred Equity is BS061, BS_PFD_EQY 
Minority Interest is BS062, MINORITY_NONCONTROLLING_INTEREST 
Total Assets is BS035, BS_TOT_ASSET 
BS_TOT_LIAB2 
Sum of all current and non current liabilities.  Figure is reported in millions; the Scaling Format Override (DY339, SCALING_FORMAT) 
can be used to change the display units for the field. 
INDUSTRIAL & UTILITIES 
Calculated as: 
Current Liabilities + Long Term Borrowings + Other Long Term Liabilities 
Where: 
   Current Liabilities is BS050, BS_CUR_LIAB 
   Long Term Borrowings is BS051,  BS_LT_BORROW 
   Other Long Term Liablities is BS052, BS_OTHER_LT_LIABILITIES 
BS_TOT_ASSET 
INDUSTRIALS 
Total Assets: 
The total of all short and long-term assets as reported on the Balance Sheet. 
BANKS 
Total Assets: 
This is the sum of Cash & bank balances, Fed funds sold & resale agreements, Investments for Trade and Sale, Net loans, Investments held 
to maturity, Net fixed assets, 
Other assets, Customers' Acceptances and Liabilities. 
FINANCIALS 
Total Assets: 
Total assets is equal to the sum of Cash & near cash items, Short-term investments & securities inventory, Net receivables, Total Long-Term 
Investments, Net fixed assets, and Other assets. 
INSURANCES 
Total Assets: 
Total assets is the sum of Cash & Near Cash Items, Net Receivables, Total Investments, Net Fixed Assets, Deferred Policy Acquisition 
Costs, and Other Assets 
UTILITIES 
Total Assets: 
This account will generally equal Total Assets in the annual report, except when Utility plant is net of deferred income taxes.  Deferred 
income taxes is presented on the credit or liability side of the balance sheet. 
This item is balancing both the debit (assets) and credit (liabilities and shareholders' equity) sides. 
REITS 
Total Assets: 
Total Assets is the sum of Net Real Estate Investments, Cash and Equivalents, Other Investments, Receivables, Other Assets and Restricted 
Assets. 
SALES_REV_TURN 
INDUSTRIALS 
Sales/Revenue/Turnover: 
Total of operating revenues less various adjustments to Gross Sales. 
Adjustments:  Returns, discounts, allowances, excise taxes, insurance charges, sales taxes, and value added taxes (VAT). 
Includes revenues from financial subsidiaries in industrial companies if the consolidation includes those subsidiaries throughout the report. 
Excludes inter-company revenue. 
Excludes revenues from discontinued operations. 
Includes subsidies from federal or local government in certain industries (i.e. transportation or utilities). 
BANKS 
Sales/Revenue/Turnover: 
Gross revenue from any operating activity. 
Total revenue is defined as the sum of total interest income, investment income, trading profit (loss), commissions and fees earned and other 
operating income. 
Excludes revenue from discontinued operations. 
Revenue may be negative due to large trading account losses. 
For Net Revenue, please refer to RR209, NET_REV. 
Japan: 
Please see IS297 for Total Operating Revenue (Japan) reported in the summary of company earnings report (Kessan Tanshin). 
FINANCIALS 
Sales/Revenue/Turnover: 
Total of interest income, trading account profits (losses), investment income, commissions and fees earned, and other operating income 
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(losses). 
Excludes revenue from discontinued operations. 
Revenue may be negative due to large trading account losses. 
For Net Revenue, please refer to RR209, NET_REV. 
INSURANCES 
Sales/Revenue/Turnover 
All revenues from any operating activities. 
The sum of net premiums earned, realized investment gain (loss), investment income, real estate operations, and other income. 
Excludes revenue from discontinued operations. 
UTILITIES 
Total Revenue: 
Includes revenues from electric, gas, water and other operating revenue. 
All revenues from any operating activity (principal activities). 
Gross revenues less adjustments. 
Excludes internal or inter-company revenues, except for privately held companies (utility subsidiaries). 
Excludes revenue from discontinued operations. 
REITS 
Sales/Revenue/Turnover: 
Revenues from real estate operating activities. Total of rental income, real estate sales (for Real Estate Operating companies), management 
and advisory fees, mortgage and note income and other operating income. 
Excludes equity in income from unconsolidated entities. 
Excludes gain/(loss) on sale of rental properties. 
IS_RD_EXPEND 
Total research and development expenditures incurred which includes R&D in profit and loss account and capitalized R&D during the 
period. In the case where total R&D expenditure is not disclosed, this field may return profit and loss account only. 
This figure may or may not be gross of government grants, subsidies, tax credits as this depends on the company disclosure.  For Jordan, 
Kuwait, and Oman, this field includes University Fees and Personnel Training Expenses. 
Available for industrial and utilities format. 
Please reference R&D Expense Adjusted (IM008, IS_OPEX_R&D) for the adjusted value that excludes the impact of abnormal items 
ARD_SALES_MKT_ADVERTISING_EXP 
Expenses related to a company's marketing and advertising for sales.  This expense may include marketing research and public relations.  
The value is as reported by the company.  The account title may be standardized and slightly different from the original account title in the 
company's financial statement.  Figure is reported in millions; the Scaling Format Override (DY339, SCALING_FORMAT) can be used to 
change the display units for the field. 
CAPEX_ABSOLUTE_VALUE 
Absolute value of the amount of fixed assets purchased during the fiscal period which is also known as capital expenditures. Unit in millions. 
Calculated as: 
Capital Expenditures * -1 
Where: 
Capital Expenditures is RR014, CAPITAL_EXPEND  
The Scaling Format Override (DY339, SCALING_FORMAT) can be used to change the display units for the field. 
TURNOVER 
Total amount traded in the security's currency. This value represents all trade prices, multiplied by the number of shares relating to each 
price. This value is then summed. 
Equity Index: 
Total amount traded in the index's currency. This value represents all trade prices for each security that belongs to the index, multiplied by 
the number of shares relating to each price. This value is then summed for each security and then totaled for the index. The value is scaled by 
a factor of 1000. 
SALES_GROWTH 
A percentage increase or decrease of sales revenue by comparing current period with same period prior year.  Calculated as: 
(Revenue from Current Period - Revenue from Same Period Prior Year) * 100 / Revenue from Same Period Prior Year 
Where: 
   Revenue is IS010, SALES_REV_TURN 
   Revenue Growth is not computed if Revenue changes signs from prior year  to  current period. 
Please reference Revenue Growth Adjusted Year over Year (F1139, REVENUE_GROWTH_ADJUSTED_YOY) for the adjusted value that 
excludes the impact of abnormal items. 
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Table 9 T-stat between countries ESG pillar 
  EN FR GER 
  E S G E S G E S G 
FR E 0.6426 - - - - - - - - 
S - N/A - - - - - - - 
G - - -2.76538 - - - - - - 
GER E 0.8375 - - N/A - - - - - 
S - N/A - - N/A - - - - 
G - - 0.630323 - - -2.521 - - - 
SCAN E 4.6618 - - 3.9386 - - -4.047 - - 
S - N/A - - N/A - - N/A - 
G - - 0.867993 - - 1.9888 - - N/A 
 
Table 10 T-stat significance level in accordance with the degree of freedom N-2 
T-table EN FR GER SCAN 
EN - 1.9603 1.9603 1.960299 
FR - - 1.9609 1.961605 
GER - - - 1.961227 
SCAN - - - - 
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Figure 1 BPG test for heteroscedasticity 
Dependent Variable: SQUARED_RESIDUALS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/17   Time: 14:46   
Sample: 11/30/2012 1/31/2017   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 1421   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 10964  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 15.58865 0.826033 18.87170 0.0000 
ENVIRONMENT 3.72E-05 0.007525 0.004937 0.9961 
SOCIAL -0.013571 0.009124 -1.487327 0.1370 
GOVERNANCE -0.010500 0.009570 -1.097156 0.2726 
SIZE -1.156003 0.065210 -17.72749 0.0000 
RISK -0.159524 0.389288 -0.409783 0.6820 
CAPEX_TOTAL_ASSETS -2.519543 4.245044 -0.593526 0.5528 
SALES_GROWTH 0.000721 0.000416 1.733065 0.0831 
TURNOVER 2.97E-11 5.02E-11 0.591174 0.5544 
COUNTRY_LAW_REGIME="English" -1.703787 0.385722 -4.417137 0.0000 
COUNTRY_LAW_REGIME="French" -1.061917 0.420555 -2.525039 0.0116 
COUNTRY_LAW_REGIME="German" -1.701988 0.417710 -4.074570 0.0000 
GICS_INDUSTRY="Consumer Staples" -0.021490 0.327772 -0.065562 0.9477 
GICS_INDUSTRY="Energy" -0.094792 0.316314 -0.299677 0.7644 
GICS_INDUSTRY="Financials" 1.744492 0.309496 5.636552 0.0000 
GICS_INDUSTRY="Health Care" 3.012422 0.314689 9.572694 0.0000 
GICS_INDUSTRY="Industrials" -1.112367 0.252630 -4.403143 0.0000 
GICS_INDUSTRY="Information Technology" 0.672950 0.281932 2.386923 0.0170 
GICS_INDUSTRY="Materials" -0.877470 0.305453 -2.872685 0.0041 
GICS_INDUSTRY="Real Estate" -1.074867 0.333453 -3.223446 0.0013 
GICS_INDUSTRY="Telecommunication 
Services" -0.260340 0.453496 -0.574074 0.5659 
GICS_INDUSTRY="Utilities" 0.047039 0.341107 0.137902 0.8903 
     
     R-squared 0.065370    Mean dependent var 1.367706 
Adjusted R-squared 0.063576    S.D. dependent var 7.484104 
S.E. of regression 7.242293    Akaike info criterion 6.799757 
Sum squared resid 573916.7    Schwarz criterion 6.814410 
Log likelihood -37254.27    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.804694 
F-statistic 36.44299    Durbin-Watson stat 0.338042 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Figure 2 Test for cross-section FE dummies joint significance 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 55.865112 (1420,9535) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 24473.092817 1420 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section fixed effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: TOBIN_Q_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/12/17   Time: 12:53   
Sample: 11/30/2012 1/31/2017   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 1421   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 10964  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 6.456252 0.276034 23.38938 0.0000 
ENVIRONMENT 0.003939 0.001025 3.843938 0.0001 
SOCIAL -0.008730 0.001198 -7.288051 0.0000 
GOVERNANCE 0.003164 0.001442 2.194676 0.0282 
SIZE -0.483401 0.020953 -23.07117 0.0000 
RISK 0.459778 0.088942 5.169397 0.0000 
CAPEX_TOTAL_ASSETS -2.909067 0.653855 -4.449103 0.0000 
TURNOVER 2.33E-11 6.06E-12 3.843370 0.0001 
SALES_GROWTH 0.000117 7.50E-05 1.560991 0.1186 
     
     R-squared 0.217486    Mean dependent var 1.904468 
Adjusted R-squared 0.216914    S.D. dependent var 1.396806 
S.E. of regression 1.236064    Akaike info criterion 3.262562 
Sum squared resid 16737.64    Schwarz criterion 3.268556 
Log likelihood -17876.36    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.264581 
F-statistic 380.5928    Durbin-Watson stat 0.254710 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Figure 3 Test for period FE dummies joint significance 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 5.001660 (8,9669) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 40.000922 8 0.0000 
     
          
Period fixed effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: TOBIN_Q_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/22/17   Time: 15:57   
Sample (adjusted): 3/07/2013 1/31/2017  
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 1406   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 9686  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 6.455463 0.118777 54.34944 0.0000 
LAG_ENVIRONMENT 0.004063 0.001152 3.525388 0.0004 
LAG_SOCIAL -0.009156 0.001459 -6.273314 0.0000 
LAG_GOVERNANCE 0.003765 0.001530 2.460892 0.0139 
SIZE -0.486409 0.010678 -45.55377 0.0000 
RISK 0.507803 0.066546 7.630854 0.0000 
TURNOVER 2.56E-11 9.99E-12 2.560864 0.0105 
CAPEX_TOTAL_ASSETS -3.336382 0.740283 -4.506899 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 6.53E-05 5.34E-05 1.221242 0.2220 
     
     R-squared 0.213024    Mean dependent var 1.913322 
Adjusted R-squared 0.212373    S.D. dependent var 1.408937 
S.E. of regression 1.250408    Akaike info criterion 3.285746 
Sum squared resid 15130.19    Schwarz criterion 3.292416 
Log likelihood -15903.87    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.288007 
F-statistic 327.4287    Durbin-Watson stat 0.088305 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
